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Introduction 
A Word on War and Strategy 
When Maxwell D. Taylor, the famed World War II commander of the lOlst 
Airborne Division, became the US Army Chief of Staff in June 1955, he 
recruited Brigadier General William Westmoreland for the position of secre-
tary of the General Staff (SGS). According to Taylor, the SGS was a "traditional 
stepping stone to senior rank" and afforded the 44-year-old Westmoreland a 
unique opportunity to consider the problems of strategy at the national level.1 
The assignment came at a time when senior military leaders were clashing with 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower over a host of strategic questions-deterrence 
of a perceived global communist threat, the role of nuclear weapons in national 
security, and the implications of burgeoning defense budgets. Westmoreland 
thus held a front-row seat as Taylor developed his views on a "National Military 
Program:' Rather than relying primarily on nuclear weapons for national secu-
rity, the army's chief argued the United States should have enough "political, 
military, economic, and moral strength sufficient to induce the Communist 
Bloc to renounce or refrain from all forms of aggression:'2 Sound strategy rested 
on more than just military muscle. In the aftermath of the Korean War, Taylor 
advocated a flexible force structure capable of defeating local wars of aggression 
while also fighting on potential nuclear battlefields. For the next three years, 
Westmoreland was "associated with virtually all of the Chief of Staff's activi-
ties;' gaining a practical education not found in the army's school system of the 
day. 3 Few officers, in truth, had the chance to glimpse the process of developing 
national strategy from such a close distance. 
Westmoreland's education in strategy took a different form when he assumed 
command of Taylor's old outfit in the spring of 19 58. Leading the 101 st Airborne 
Division entailed putting strategic theory into practice for an officer who had 
just spent the last three years working at the highest levels inside the Pentagon. 
Taylor's advocacy of more flexible army formations led to the development of 
"Pentomic" divisions, units no longer based on the triangular concept of three 
regiments but on five independent "battle groups:' Westmoreland took over the 
lOlst just as it was preparing for the final shakedown exercise that would mark 
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it as a combat-ready Pentomic. (With an atomic-armed rocket battery, the lOlst 
was the first US Army division to have ai1 organic nuclear capability. )4 Because 
of the division's designation as a rapid deployment force requiring movement 
within six hours of an emergency notification, Westmoreland stressed constant 
readiness as he watched the Lebanon crisis unfold in the summer of 1958. He 
kept a close eye as well on the rising levels of violence in Indochina over the next 
two years. These emerging local threats helped spur the general to create a spe-
cial "Recondo" school that focused training on "counterinsurgency warfare, with 
an emphasis on small-unit operations:'s In short, Westmoreland's command of 
the lOlst provided him the chance to put abstract strategic theories into con-
crete operational practice. 
Westmoreland's final assignment before heading to South Vietnam served as 
a sort of strategic finishing school for the future Military Assistance Command, 
Vietnam (MACV) commander. In the summer of 1960, Westmoreland relin-
quished command at Fort Campbell and assumed the post of superintendent 
of the United States Military Academy. For the next three years, the general met 
with foreign dignitaries, congressional delegations, senior military leaders, Vice 
President Lyndon Baines Johnson, and President John F. Kennedy.Johnson, who 
gave the commencement address in 1961, was followed by Kennedy in 1962. In 
his remarks, Kennedy told the commissioning class they could no longer focus 
on "strictly military responsibilities:' Their future assignments, taking them 
across the globe, would "require a versatility and an adaptability never before 
required in either war or peace:'A..s the president put it, service in such places as 
Vietnam would place unprecedented "burdens" on a new generation of military 
leaders.6 Just two years later, Kennedy's message would prove to have special 
meaning for not only the graduating cadets but also Westmoreland himself. 
The three years at West Point were busy ones for Westmoreland and illus-
trated his growing appreciation of the challenges young army officers would face 
in the early 1960s. He oversaw revision of the academic curriculum aimed at 
promoting the intellectual development of cadets across a wide range of topics, 
from math and engineering to history and philosophy. Drawing upon his experi-
ence with the lOlst, Westmoreland instituted Recondo training for cadets and 
formed a committee whose recommendations led to the adoption of 54 hours 
of instruction on counterinsurgency over a cadet's four-year West Point experi-
ence. Given the growing number of US advisors being sent to South Vietnam, 
the superintendent hosted a senior British general who had fought against the 
communist insurgency in Malaya. He also refocused cadet summer training 
and sponsored a counterinsurgency conference that featured Walt W. Rostow, 
a special national security advisor in the Kennedy White House, as the keynote 
speaker.7 While at West Point, Westmoreland was exposed to the question of 
strategy as an intellectual problem that required serious professional study. 
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In three successive assignments-on the Pentagon staff, as a division com-
mander, and as academy superintendent-the general thus grappled with dis-
tinct, yet corresponding, aspects of US strategy in the Cold War era even though 
he had little experience with strategic planning per se.8 But what did strategy 
really mean to American military officers and civilian policymakers in the decade 
before William Westmoreland departed for command in Vietnam? Clearly the 
general had taken part in discussions and training that reflected contemporary 
strategic concerns, whether they be debates over force structure or the best way 
to train for conflict in the post-World War II period. But what were the implica-
tions of these forays into the realm of strategy? It seems reasonable to suggest 
that both Westmoreland and the US Army as a whole in the late 19 SOs and early 
1960s understood that strategy meant more than just leadership or tactical skill 
on the battlefield. We should also consider the prospect that many army officers 
went to Vietnam with a more expansive definition of strategy in mind than is 
generally realized. Reassessing Westmoreland's war in Vietnam therefore first 
requires a broader reconsideration of how American military leaders came to 
think about the word "strategy" in the early 1960s. 
Strategy is more than just how a nation and its armed forces think about and 
discuss war. Language, as was the case in Vietnam, often can prove insufficient 
for fully articulating strategic concepts like attrition or annihilation. Even the 
word itself, strategy-first used in antiquity to describe the art and skill of a gen-
eral-can disorient and confuse when applied in modern contexts. (One stu-
dent of the subject during the Vietnam years called it "a loose sort of a word:') 9 
In large part, this potential for confusion stems from the fact that strategy is both 
a concept and a process. It is an idea-and a highly contingent one-for how 
military force should be used to achieve political objectives, as well as the way 
such force actually is employed in a time of war. Thus, in evaluating strategy, his-
torians arguably are best served when exploring not only what an army discusses 
but what it does. Contemporary lexicon, of course, can be inadequate when 
attempting to explain the intricacies of complex wars, and incongruities almost 
always exist between what is being done and said. One must also consider the 
climate in which the definition is being used and for what purpose. Moreover, 
the concept of strategy has evolved over time.10 
Take, for instance, how Carl von Clausewitz, writing in the aftermath of the 
Napoleonic Wars, approached the topic. In On War, the Prussian theorist defined 
strategy as "the use of the engagement for the purpose of war:'11 Such a limited 
conception of the word centered on the commander's ability to shape individual 
campaigns, what is called "operational art" in today's military vocabulary, for 
achieving a political objective. In this sense, strategy focused on the conduct 
of battles and its results. A commander aimed to achieve tactical successes in 
such a way that led directly to a political goal. Clausewitz's ideal found no better 
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expression than in Napoleon's stunning victory at Austerlitz. The emperor's 1805 
masterpiece battle not only crushed the 1hird Coalition but compelled Austria 
to sign the Treaty of Press burg and effectively forced the Hapsburg Empire out 
of the war. Battle, and the planning behind its execution, had resulted in a tan-
gible political outcome. 
A close read of On War, however, suggests that Clausewitz believed the inter-
play between military means and political aims encompassed more than sim-
ply using battlefield engagements for a specific political purpose. "It is only in 
the highest realms of strategy," he argued, "that intellectual complications and 
extreme diversity of factors and relationships occur. At that level there is little 
to no difference between strategy, policy and statesmanship:' Strategy, in this 
sense, became more than "the art of skillfully exploiting force for a larger pur-
pose:'12 Clausewitz thus used the term in two different senses, one for what we 
might consider today operational design, the other for general war planning. 
In some contexts he used the more limited, restrictive definition and in others 
employed the term to impress upon his readers a much broader meaning. In 
both versions of the concept, though, Clausewitz emphasized that war was a 
function of interdependent variables, whether they be the unique capabilities 
of the commander or the oftentimes shifting political intentions of the govern-
ment. Consequently, fixed rules and prescriptions were unsuited for a fuller 
understanding of strategy. 13 
In the wake of the First World War, British military theorist Basil H. Liddell 
Hart rendered a severe, and highly tendentious, criticism of Clausewitz's sup-
posed glorification of battle as the principal element of strategy. Surely there 
were other means to one's political ends than the wholesale killing of a genera-
tion of young men. Liddell Hart thus strove to broaden strategy's definition, 
emphasizing not only the application of force but its distribution and allocation 
over space and time. Strategy therefore meant "the art of distributing and apply-
ing military means to fulfill the ends of policy:'14 Liddell Hart certainly con-
cerned himself with the conduct of military operations as well as their effects, 
yet found a narrow focus on military instruments dangerous. A nation's armed 
forces had to serve a sensible policy, one that properly allocated and coordinated 
national resources in such a way that regulated the use of force "to avoid dam-
age to the future state of peace:' Here was the art of "grand strategy," a concept 
that encompassed more than just fighting power. Liddell Hart argued that other 
instruments of power-financial, diplomatic, commercial, even ethical-could 
be brought to bear for weakening an opponent's will. Strategy was more than 
"the pure utilization ofbattle:'15 
Liddell Hart's expanded definition of strategy implied that a nation's leaders 
establish priorities when establishing political objectives in a time of war, a topic 
highlighted by more recent commentators like Colin Gray. Gray's contributions 
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to the literature have in part concentrated on the civil-military relationships 
required for the successful prosecution of strategy. If strategy "seeks control over 
an enemy's political behaviour" it also serves as the "bridge that relates mili-
tary power to political purpose; it is neither military power per se nor political 
purpose:'16 Good strategists and policymakers thus not only need a vision but 
a policy that provides aim and direction for those waging war. In Gray's formula-
tion, the strategic bridge helps "connect policy purposefully with the military 
and other instruments of power and influence."17 In an age of nuclear weapons, 
such a definition made patent sense. Yet Gray's observations are hardly novel. 
General Matthew B. Ridgway, writing in the Korean War's aftermath, main-
tained that civilian leaders needed "to work closely with military authorities in 
setting attainable goals and in selecting the means to attain them:'18 Strategy was 
not the exclusive preserve of uniformed officers. 
These few examples of strategic definitions, far from comprehensive, under-
score the elasticity of the word "strategy" and how different characterizations 
can serve very different needs. Yet it would be misleading to propose that civilian 
and military leaders always develop strategy based on well-laid plans. Strategy 
can be, and too often is, a matter of improvisation. Given the sheer complexity of 
the topic, this should not be surprising. Recall Clausewitz's interdependent vari-
ables which strategists must address not only when planning for war but when 
directing it as well. Systematic analysis is not always possible in the fog of war, 
whether it be a conventional or unconventional conflict. The eminent British 
historian Michael Howard well articulated this phenomenon in his explora-
tion of Anglo-American Mediterranean strategy in the Second World War. As 
Howard maintained, the "development of British-and Allied-strategy was 
a piecemeal affair, in which military leaders had often simply to do what they 
could, where they could, with the forces which they had to hand:'19 Is it possible 
that strategists more often than not extemporize when it comes to war? 
In part, such improvisation fulfills an important role in strategy. War is an 
undertaking of chance, uncertainty, and reciprocal action between actors who 
make choices before and during actual conflict. In this environment, strategy 
cannot be stagnant. Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke, writing in 1871, 
believed strategy was a "system of expedients ... the continued development of 
the original leading thought in accordance with constantly changing circum-
stances:'20 Learning and adaptation thus seem essential considerations for those 
planning and prosecuting war at the strategic level. The trouble, of course, is 
that military commanders often find it difficult to make momentous changes to 
their doctrine and units' organizational structures once committed to open hos-
tilities. Few soldiers tend toward self-examination in the heat of battle. Military 
organizations, traditional in nature and hierarchical in structure, also are inclined 
to be constrained by cultural preferences that circumscribe leaders' visions of 
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what might be possible outside of normal routine. "Nevertheless," von Moltke 
claimed, "the conduct of war does not lapse into blind, arbitrary action:'21 
This appears to be the case at the two most recognized levels of strategy-
grand strategy and military strategy. While the two terms are not synony-
mous, they most certainly are interdependent. Policy influences both levels but 
remains a separate entity unto itself. The term grand strategy, evoking the multi-
dimensional definition of strategy promoted by Liddell Hart, includes the rela-
tionships among a nation's allies, enemies, and neutral countries. It entails the 
coordination of military and nonmilitary means that support long-term political 
interests and attempts to tailor theater, if not larger regional, operations to real-
istic national security objectives. 22 In the context of the Vietnam War, contem-
porary critics protested that an overly ambitious military strategy inside South 
Vietnam was forcing the United States to cut back on its global commitments 
in the larger Cold War effort. Seasoned diplomat George Kennan, for instance, 
complained in 1965 that Washington had lost "almost all flexibility of choice" 
in Vietnam and in its "approach to the communist world generallY:'23 American 
political and military leaders consequently found themselves limiting their mili-
tary strategy in Southeast Asia to better support the nation's grand strategy for 
the overarching Cold War. 
As with strategy, definitions abound for the term grand strategy. Barry Posen, 
as an example, describes grand strategy as "a political-military, means-ends 
chain, a state's theory about how it can best 'cause' security for itself' Other com-
mentators have classified the term as the "art and science of employing national 
power" or of relating a nation's instruments of power and influence to its vital 
interests. 24 For evaluating US strategy in Vietnam, however, it seems best to use 
contemporary terminology. American military leaders and civilian policymak-
ers might not have benefited from more recent explorations into the complex 
topic of strategy but they certainly wrestled with its conceptual and theoreti-
cal problems during the Cold War. Thus, for the purposes of this study, the US 
Army's 1962 Field Service Regulations provides a useful definition for what was 
then called "national strategy:' The army's doctrine opined that "national strat-
egy is the long range plan through which a nation applies its strength toward 
the attainment of its objectives:' In line with Liddell Hart's concept, the army 
included all elements of national power into this broad description: "political, 
economic, psychological, and military and ... other national assets such as geo-
graphic location and spiritual attitudes."25 
Supporting this grand vision, army doctrine defined military strategy as the 
"development and use of the military means which further national strategy 
though the direct or indirect application of military power:'26 While this work 
focuses on American strategy inside South Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, such 
a definition proves too narrow for fully evaluating how William Westmoreland 
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sought to fulfill American objectives in the Vietnam War. The ground war over 
which Westmoreland exercised command and influence included much more 
than strict military means. Instead, this study relies on the more general defi-
nition of strategy published as part of a 1961 Dictionary of United States Army 
Terms. The army characterized strategy as the "art and science of developing and 
using the political, economic, psychological, and armed forces of a nation, dur-
ing peace and war, to afford the maximum support to national policies, in order 
to increase the probabilities of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat."27 
As will be argued, Westmoreland embraced this broader definition of strategy 
instead of focusing strictly on destruction of the enemy's military forces. It is 
important to note, however, the constraints MACV's commander faced in devel-
oping his campaign plans and concepts of operation. As Westmoreland recalled, 
his "responsibilities and prerogatives were basically confined within the borders 
of South Vietnam:'28 American strategy in Vietnam paradoxically was as com-
prehensive as it was limited. 
Assessing Strategy 
So how should one assess strategy? Is victory or defeat the only true metric for 
evaluating a strategy? Is it possible to develop a sound strategy and still lose? It 
seems problematic to assess any strategy without reference to its successes and 
failures. Even if strategy is more a process than an outcome, ideally it should 
evolve in the direction of success. Should one assess strategy through an evalu-
ation of the strategist alone? Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery's quip that 
the right man with the right plan would suffice for British victory in Malaya 
seems unsatisfactory for explaining the outcome of a war as complex as Vietnam. 
Strategy entails both purpose and the design for achieving that purpose and, 
as was the case in Vietnam, the man on the ground does not always devise the 
overarching purpose for strategy. 29 Westmoreland certainly conceived his own 
strategic plan but the president and secretary of defense assigned the general his 
military and political objectives. As will be argued, the Johnson administration 
made few if any grand strategic reassessments as the war evolved. 
Moreover, defining victory in Vietnam became just as thorny a problem as 
articulating strategy itsel£ As US combat forces deployed to Southeast Asia in 
mid-1965, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara listed nine fundamental 
elements for achieving a "favorable outcome" in Vietnam, among them reduc-
ing incidents of terror and sabotage, ensuring the Saigon government remained 
independent (and "hopefully pro-US"), and forcing North Vietnam to withdraw 
its forces from the south. Also at play, of course, was the will of the enemy. 30 
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Would a successful strategy account for all of these elements or rather determine 
which among these numerous political and military objectives actually were 
achievable? Were all elements necessary for achieving the strategic end-state and 
thus victory? 
The conventional answer to these questions posits that Westmoreland failed 
to understand his environment, neglected new ideas, and implemented a nar-
row strategy of attrition that led ultimately to failure. Unquestionably, recent 
scholarship by the likes of Graham Cosmas, Andrew Birtle, and John Prados has 
moved beyond this rather oversimplified picture. Notwithstanding these new 
contributions, the conventional narrative continues to shape not only popular 
but more scholarly literature.31 Eventual defeat in Vietnam reinforced argu-
ments that MACV's commander presided over a flawed strategy. Constrained 
by an organizational culture favoring firepower and enemy-centric operations, 
Westmoreland, along with most of the US Army officers he led, "devoted 
insufficient attention to pacification" in their quest for high body counts. One 
American journalist further claimed that US strategists "misgauged the North 
Vietnamese and Vietcong by applying their own values to them:'32 For such crit-
ics, the causal chain effortlessly linked poorly conceived strategy, implemented 
in a heavy-handed manner, to failure in Vietnam. 
Yet is seems plausible to argue that every army responds to stimuli, both 
internal and external, when developing and carrying out its strategic concepts. 
Admittedly, reactive change does not equal institutional learning. Still, even 
armies slow to learn in new environments must act in response to their sur-
roundings. A proper strategy is one that responds to local, regional, and even 
international conditions. Culture may help explain organizational choices but it 
by no means dictates those choices. Accordingly, the longer an army is involved 
in war, searching for victory, one should expect to find an evolution of strategic 
thinking over time. In this sense, strategy is a process steeped in problem solv-
ing. For the US Army in Vietnam-confronting military, political, social, and 
economic issues all simultaneously-the chief difficulty came from finding the 
proper relationships between and among these diverse problem sets. The path 
to victory hardly ran in a straight line through the destruction of enemy forces, a 
point well understood by William Westmoreland.33 
Thus, this study assumes that to properly evaluate strategy one must assess 
how armies draw conclusions from their environment, from their own experi-
ences, and from the experiences of others, particularly those of the enemy. An 
evaluation of strategy also must consider how armies draw upon their own his-
tory. Perceived lessons from the past often are interpreted within existing intel-
lectual and doctrinal constructs. The US Army of the 1950s and 1960s (or, more 
accurately, military intellectuals within the army) learned lessons from World 
War II and Korea that confirmed many officers' preexisting visions of war.34 
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Victory came from defeating the enemy in the field. Yet the legacy of these wars 
did not straightjacket officers into viewing strategy as simply using battlefield 
engagements for achieving a political purpose. Change may have been unnatu-
ral for veterans of the Second World War and Korea, but they did realize that 
the conflict in Southeast Asia diverged significantly from their past experiences. 
Despite their cultural affinity toward conventional warfare, many US Army offi-
cers in the 1960s, Westmoreland included, embraced a wider definition of strat-
egy that appeared better suited to the environment of South Vietnam.35 
The point here is that observing the process of strategy is as important as 
assessing the theory behind it. Enticing as it is to judge war simply through the 
lens of victory or defeat, such evaluations suffer from reduction. Outcome can-
not solely explain process. This is particularly true for a war as multifaceted as 
Vietnam. Officers like Westmoreland wrestled with the thorny problems of 
translating American power into feasible strategic concepts for a conflict that 
was at once a revolutionary war, a limited-scale conventional war, an internal 
political struggle, and a contest within the larger Cold War. As one observer 
recalled, in "intellectual terms, understanding the war in Vietnam demanded a 
great deal more than had prior US overseas conflicts. In military terms alone, it 
was a complicated shifting war, without a front line to signal progress:'36 General 
Maxwell Taylor, who served as ambassador to Vietnam in 1964 and 1965, found 
equal challenges in bridging the gap between policy and performance. "One of 
the facts oflife about Vietnam;' Taylor recalled, "was that it was never difficult to 
decide what should be done but it was almost impossible to get it done, at least 
in an acceptable period of time:' In short, merely ascertaining success or failure 
is insufficient alone for judging strategy.37 
Reconsidering Strategy in Vietnam 
In the process of assigning blame for a lost war, histories often have overlooked 
the nonmilitary aspects of American strategy in Vietnam. For decades, crit-
ics of the war have relied on catchphrases like "attrition," "body counts;' and 
"search-and-destroy;' all of which have become mainstays within Vietnam War 
literature. One historian has even described Westmoreland's "strategic equation" 
as "mobility+ firepower= attrition:'38 Strategy could not be made any simpler. 
Yet attrition, "a word commonly employed but rarely defined," has helped distort 
the historical record of the Vietnam War. German academic Hans Delbriick first 
used the term Ermattungsstrategie (a "wearing out" or "attrition" strategy) in the 
early 1900s when defining an alternative to an annihilation strategy and the con-
cept soon took hold for explaining the destructiveness of World War l.39 In the 
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aftermath of the slaughter on the Western Front, attrition assumed an ominous 
meaning. Critics argued an attrition strategy lacked aim, was unimaginative or 
used as a last resort, and, in the extreme, was "irrefutable proof of the absence of 
strategy:' Journalist Ward Just, writing in 1969, maintained attrition was "an ugly 
word, signifying a long-drawn-out struggle with many dead and one side or the 
other exhausted and beaten at the end:'40 
Pundits further claimed that the US Army's attraction with killing the enemy 
flowed directly from its experiences in World War II when generals viewed mili-
tary strategy only as a matter of attacking the enemy in the most efficient and 
effective manner possible. Guided by the political aim of forcing the Axis powers 
to accept an "unconditional surrender,'' senior American officers sought to place 
"unremitting pressure" on the enemy. Destruction of German and Japanese 
armed forces thus ranked high among US strategic objectives.41 In Vietnam, 
however, applying overwhelming military power to destroy the enemy seemed 
out of place. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, himself a critic ofWestmoreland's 
strategy, wrote to Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1966 that "'Seek out and 
destroy' should not be an end unto itsel£ as it rightly was in World War II. This 
war will not be won by killing Viet Cong or soldiers of North Viet-Nam, but 
by destroying terrorist organizations in South Viet-Nam:' While Westmoreland 
retorted that Lodge did "not have a deep feel of military tactics and strategy" and 
was "inclined to over-simplify the military situation," the ambassador's critique 
represents a particular commentary on US strategy in Vietnam.42 
Lodge's assessment, however, presumed American strategic thought had 
remained stagnant in the wake of World War II. Yet many US Army officers well 
understood the changes wrought by the Second World War, chief among them 
the advent of atomic weaponry and the process of decolonization in Africa, 
India, and Southeast Asia. Warfare seemed at once more constrained and com-
prehensive. If no political objectives were worth fighting a general nuclear war, 
then localized aggression, ostensibly sponsored by communist agents, required 
a credible response beyond just military means. Strategies of annihilation risked 
just that-obliteration not only of opposing armed forces but of entire nations.43 
In this context, it should be unsurprising that contemporary definitions of strat-
egy evolved to encompass more than just battlefield engagements. If one aim 
of war was to achieve "some measure of control over the enemy,'' then strate-
gists had to incorporate elements of power besides military into their planning, 
a point not lost on US Army officers. One lieutenant colonel, writing his student 
thesis for the Army War College in 1963, noted that "the number of situations 
requiring a strategy coordinating military, political and economic factors seems 
always increasing:' The officer went on to argue that "the effective study of mili-
tary strategy [could] be accomplished only within the broader framework of 
political and economic relationships:'44 
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Such a broad approach seems best for understanding American strategy in 
Vietnam. vVestmoreland, for instance, did not subscribe to a narrow strategy 
of attrition, just as he did not subscribe exclusively to a counterinsurgency 
approach. In fact, American strategy proved much more expansive; conse-
quently, Westmoreland exercised influence in a variety of ways, both directly 
and indirectly. True, the compartmentalized nature of the Vietnam War ensured 
that the MACV commander's authority paled in comparison to that of Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander of the European theater in 
World War ll.45 Westmoreland recalled, for example, that his "interest in the 
air war was somewhat incidental" because of the "dichotomy in organization 
between the air war and the ground war:' Still, as will be seen, the general had 
to accommodate, integrate, and direct a wide array of activities inside South 
Vietnam.46 
Westmoreland's chief intelligence officer drew attention to MACV's diverse 
undertakings. As Phillip B. Davidson recalled, the general "had not one battle, 
but three to fight: first, to contain a growing enemy conventional threat; second, 
to develop the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces (RVNAF); and third, to 
pacify and protect the peasants in the South Vietnamese countryside. Each was a 
monumental task:'47 Westmoreland thus had to develop a concept of operations 
for the employment of US forces in South Vietnam, provide advice and assis-
tance to the RVNAF, support civil operations and pacification, and advise both 
the Commander in Chie£ Pacific ( CINCPAC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 
strategic issues. It is equally important to note Westmoreland's occasional direct 
interaction with the commander in chie£ Military success alone would not suf-
fice for achieving US objectives in Vietnam. As Westmoreland himself argued in 
early 1967, "Political, economic, and psychological victory is equally important, 
and support of Revolutionary Development is mandatory:'48 
The first section of this work provides context on Cold War strategy and 
doctrine and the growing US involvement in Vietnam. Thematic chapters then 
analyze Westmoreland's multiple tasks as MACV's commander. The first reas-
sessment concentrates on the strategic concept for the ground war devised by 
Westmoreland, a topic as hotly contested today as it was in the early 1960s. 
Critics argued, and still do, that MACV misjudged the nature of the war, focus-
ing on the symptoms and not the cause of the problem in South Vietnam. As 
one colonel claimed, military professionals in Vietnam incorrectly focused 
on the guerrilla threat and thereby confused tactics with strategy. 49 Certainly, 
the nature of the threat looms large in any conversation on strategy. The chap-
ters on Westmoreland's strategy and the tactics employed to support strategic 
objectives thus highlight the discord among political and military officials over 
whether internal subversion or external aggression posed the greatest threat 
to South Vietnam's independence. The war, of course, did not fit easily into a 
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standard framework. Westmoreland consequently had to discern not only the 
nature of the threat but of the war as a whole. "The real question," one senior 
officer recalled, "was not what was the proper strategy to guide the ground war 
in South Vietnam, but what kind of war was the United States fighting in Vietnam 
at any given period."50 
The second section focuses on the role the US Army played in supporting 
civil operations and pacification. As with the ground war, this topic engenders 
strong disagreement among historians. Most critics contend that Westmoreland 
gave little notice to pacification and one recent biography even dismisses the 
topic whole cloth, apparently to suggest that MACV ignored fully the war's non-
military aspects. Under Westmoreland, however, pacification-what one study 
termed "the establishment of internal security, political stability, and economic 
viability"-became an integral part of MACV's concept of operations.51 Most 
army officers in Vietnam understood the importance their adversaries placed on 
political activity, especially in the countryside. MACV equally appreciated the 
relationships between territorial security and the need for reviving the Saigon 
government's rural administration and services. The problem, one of implemen-
tation, arose from imbalances between the constructive efforts of pacification 
and the destructive results of military operations.52 As the US embassy reported 
in early 1965, the limited effectiveness of pacification programs following "on 
the heels of military clearing operations" served as a major "cause oflack of prog-
ress against the insurgencY:'53 If pacification efforts were to succeed, MACV had 
to find balance in its approach to both the political and military struggles then 
being waged in South Vietnam. 
The final area in which to reconsider Westmoreland's strategy falls within the 
realm of MACV's advice and assistance to the RVNAF, particularly the South 
Vietnamese Army (ARVN). The general realized early on that while US forces 
might be able to "dislodge the Communists from local areas"-itself a dubious 
prospect-they "would not have a 'lasting effect' unless the South Vietnamese 
were able to retain control over such areas:'54 Westmoreland accordingly con-
ferred often with his counterpart General Cao Van Vien and urged RVNAF lead-
ership to correct persistent shortcomings that appeared to be hampering the war 
effort. As with pacification, the challenge Westmoreland faced lay in implemen-
tation. The decision to deploy US forces to South Vietnam rested on the conclu-
sion that the RVNAF was on the verge of collapse in early 1965. How best to 
divide responsibilities between Americans and South Vietnamese remained a 
matter of debate throughout the war. While Westmoreland conceived of using 
American forces primarily in an offensive role, MACV recognized that for "polit-
ical and psychological reasons the conflict must retain primarily a Vietnamese 
character at all times:•ss Clearly, that goal would be difficult to achieve with nearly 
400,000 Americans serving in South Vietnam by the end of 1966, a number that 
Introduction 
Figure 0.1 REUNION. General Westmoreland visits his family in Hawaii, 1965, after 
President Lyndon Johnson ordered the evacuation of more than 1,800 American 
dependents from Vietnam in February 1965. (WPUSC, Westmoreland Family Photos) 
13 
would rise to more than 530,000 troops by the time Westmoreland left com-
mand in mid-1968. 
One could reason that few historical precedents existed for a military com-
mander juggling a comparable array of responsibilities. Journalist Robert 
Shaplen, perhaps overstating his case in mid-1967, argued that it was "doubtful 
if any commander in the history of warfare has ever faced such a complicated 
combination of tasks as Westmoreland:' Still, fellow correspondent Hanson 
Baldwin agreed, characterizing the general as a "theater commander with more 
responsibility and less authority than any in our historY:'56 Surely single declara-
tive words like "attrition'' were, and are, insufficient for communicating the intri-
cacy ofWestmoreland's war. The conflict was a synthesis of political and military 
action, pacification efforts and conventional tactics, and technological advances 
and deep historical imperatives that bedeviled those seeking straightforward 
explanations of strategy and tactics. As General Frederick C. Weyand remarked 
in late 1968, efforts to categorize the war using terms like "search-and-destroy" 
or "massive sweeps" failed to convey accurately the situation in the field. "The 
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truth is that the strategy I was directed to pursue during the past two and a half 
years involved every type of military operation I have ever heard of and some 
I hadn't heard of'57 If attrition truly steered Westmoreland's strategy, one might 
expect a professional such as Weyand to be more certain of the role he played as 
a senior officer in Westmoreland's command. 
In the last 30 years, however, Westmoreland has become a caricature, an 
incarnation of Gilbert and Sullivan's "Modem Major General" from The Pirates 
of Penzance. Surely, he was not as obtuse as some historians and other critics 
would have us believe.58 Hence, this work makes the argument that William 
Westmoreland, and the organization he led, not only learned and adapted 
in Vietnam but also developed a comprehensive strategy best suited for the 
multifaceted environment in which the US Army was operating. Many offi-
cers, Westmoreland included, understood the problems associated with rising 
nationalism and decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s. Their strategy, while 
comprehensively planned and faithfully implemented, was not sufficient in 
itself for securing victory in Vietnam. It seems that the one common failing of 
most military officers and senior civilian officials-among them MACV's com-
mander-was their faith that military power, broadly defined, could achieve 
political objectives in post-colonial states during the Cold War era. This, of 
course, presents an uncomfortable truth, especially for those who served, and 
continue to serve, in uniform.59 Talented American generals can develop and 
implement a comprehensive political-military strategy and still lose a war. 
